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Special education is a conglomeration of a number of sub-fields. Historically, the 
sub-fields have been organized around so-called categories of "exceptionality" or "disa· 
bility." As such, each sub-specialty within special education has its own professional 
knowledge, which reflects the presumed differences among the categories of exception-
ality. Nevertheless, behind the surface differences each of the sub-fields subscribes to a 
basic foundation of general special education knowledge. What is of interest here is this 
tradition of general special education knowledge, which, for convenience sake, we will 
refer to simply as special education knowledge. 
Another challenge in discussing special education knowledge is deciding on whose 
version to accept as the genuine article. To draw a crude analogy, asking the special 
education community about the nature of its professional know ledge is like asking a 
school of fish about the nature of water. Neither group can be depended upon for an 
adequate answer because these matters are so basic to them that they are largely taken 
for granted. Thus, bringing a number of perspectives to bear upon the subject will be 
helpful. The best way to do this is to consider some of the criticisms of traditional special 
education knowledge. There is no shortage of such criticism. 
Special education knowledge follows a threefold model of professional knowledge 
(Schein, 1972, p. 43): 
1. An underlying discipline or basic science component upon which the practice rests 
or from which it is developed. 
2. An applied science or "engineering" component from which many of the day-to-day 
diagnostic procedures and problem-solutions are derived. 
3. A skills and attitudinal component that concerns the actual performance of services 
to the client, using the underlying basic and applied knowledge. 
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According to the model, special education knowledge is 
grounded in the theoretical knowledge of an underlying dis-
cipline or basic science. At the applied science level of the 
model, theoretical knowledge is translated into applied 
knowledge, or models, techniques, and procedures for appli-
cation to the day-to-day problems of practice. Finally, spe-
cial education's theoretically grounded applied knowledge 
yields practical knowledge, which is transmitted to the spe-
cial education practitioner-in the form of knowledge, 
skills, attitudes, and norms-through an extended program 
of training and indoctrination that constitutes professional 
education in special education. The performance of special 
education professional services to clients-by the special 
education teacher, clinician, or therapist-is based on prac-
tical knowledge, which is conceptualized as the result of 
applying theoretical knowledge to solving problems of spe-
cial education practice. 
Historically, two general types of criticism of special 
education knowledge are found: practical and theoretical. 
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These can be understood in terms of the above model of 
special education professional knowledge. Practical criti-
cism refers to criticism of special education practical knowl-
edge-the knowledge and skills that underwrite the actual 
performance of services to the client by the professional 
special education practitioner. As we will use the term, 
theoretical criticism refers to criticism of both special edu-
cation theoretical and applied knowledge-both the theoret-
ical knowledge of the underlying discipline or basic science 
and the applied knowledge engineered from theoretical 
knowledge by special education applied researchers. 
PRACTICAL CRITICISM OF SPECIAL 
EDUCATION KNOWLEDGE 
Of the two general types of criticism, practical criticism 
has been the most visible and has had the greatest impact 
on the way special education services are delivered to stu-
dents. Practical criticism, centered on the actual practice of 
special education, has been mounted by parents, consumers 
and advocates, and, to some extent, special educators them-
selves (e.g., Dunn, 1968; Blatt & Kaplan, 1966). Histori-
cally, critical debate has revolved around the relationship 
between regular and special education in terms of the iden-
tification, placement, and education of students with dis-
abilities. In fact, much of today's special education practice 
has evolved as a response to yesterday's practical criticism. 
Although this mutually-shaping relationship between practi-
cal criticism and changes in practice can be traced over the 
entire history of special education, in the modem era its 
most intense and fruitful phase was the 10-year period from 
1965 to 1975. 
At the height of the social-political ferment of the 1960s, 
parents and consumers and advocates used the period's in-
creased sensitivity to human and civil rights to mount a case 
against special education as it was practiced at that time. 
This particular round of practical criticism led to victories 
in courtrooms and statehouses across the country and even-
tually in the U.S. Congress, which ultimately redefined 
special education practice under the rubric of the statutory 
mandate of Public Law 94-142, The Education for All Hand-
icapped Children Act of 1975. 
PL 94-142 essentially mandates a free, appropriate public 
education for all students with disabilities in the least restric-
tive-most integrated-environment possible. It changed 
special education practice by changing its structural relation-
ship to regular education and by extending to students and 
their parents certain constitutional rights and procedural 
safeguards, including due process of law. Of course, PL 
94-142 did not end critical commentary on special education 
practice. Public debate and legal action over the precise 
meaning of "appropriate education" and "least restrictive 
environment," among other concepts, have continued over 
the 10 years of the law's implementation (Turnbull, 1986). 
But the point to be made here is that practical criticism 
led to changes in special education practice. An important 
point to grasp is that the changes brought about by PL 
94-142 did not result from theoretical criticism. The law 
itself (and the changes in practice that have resulted from 
it) was the product of moral, ethical, legal, and political 
arguments against special education practice at that time 
(Ballard-Campbell & Semmel, 1981; Bilden, 1985). 
THEORETICAL CRITICISM OF SPECIAL 
EDUCATION KNOWLEDGE 
Ultimately, theoretical criticism of special education 
knowledge is also criticism of special education practice. 
But, as it is used here, it is essentially criticism of the 
manner in which basic science theory is applied at the applied 
science level of special education knowledge. Thus, the 
targets of theoretical criticism are special education applied 
researchers, developers, and policy analysts within univer-
sities and at all levels of government. Whereas practical 
criticism of special education has been mounted primarily 
by consumers and advocates, theoretical criticism tends to 
come from the academic disciplines-primarily from the 
social sciences-and is based on three claims: atheoretical, 
confounded theory, and wrong theory. 
The Atheoretical Claim 
The first type of theoretical criticism is based on the claim 
that special education applied research and practice operate 
in the absence of any guiding theory (e.g., Bogdan & Kugel-
mass, 1984; Rist & Harrell, 1982; Tomlinson, 1982). It is 
argued that, instead of being grounded in the theories of an 
underlying discipline or basic science, special education 
applied research and practice are guided by a narrow set of 
unconscious assumptions. Bogdan and Kugelmass (1984) 
summarized special education's unconscious assumptions 
as follows: 
(1) Disability is a condition that individuals have; (2) disabled/typical 
is a useful and objective distinction; (3) special education is a ration-
ally conceived and coordinated system of services that help children 
labelled disabled; ( 4) progress in the field is made by improving 
diagnosis, intervention and technology. (p. 173) 
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While not denying the accuracy of the Bogdan and Kugel-
mass analysis of special education's assumptions-indeed, 
I believe that these are precisely the basic beliefs that im-
plicitly serve as guides for research and practice in special 
education-when examined more closely, they reveal that 
the "atheoretical" part of their claim cannot be justified. 
The first two assumptions-that disability is a condition that 
people have, and that disabled/typical is a useful and objec-
tive distinction-derive directly from theories of deviance 
in the basic sciences of psychology and biology. The third 
assumption-that special education is a rationally conceived 
and coordinated system of services-actually has two 
theoretical sources. The first source is the positivist theory 
of knowledge, which serves as the foundation for the domin-
ant model of professional knowledge (Schon, 1984; Schein, 
1972; Glazer, 1974). Special education, like all professional 
fields, implicitly believes that its knowledge is the end prod-
uct of a rational system of knowledge production. The sec-
ond source of this assumption is a general theory of organi-
zational rationality, which until recently has dominated 
thinking and writing about all organizations, including 
schools (see Clark, 1985; Weick, 1985). It has been so 
central to the organization of industrialized societies that it 
permeates the consciousness of all industrialized people, 
even if they don't realize it. 
The fourth assumption-about the nature of progress-de-
rives from the notion of cumulative knowledge that under-
writes the positivist theory of knowledge, as well as the 
dominant conceptualization of scientific progress ( discussed 
later). The point is that, although special education research 
and practice are guided by unconscious beliefs, one can 
hardly claim that these beliefs have no theoretical basis at 
all. The real problem for special education is the uncon-
scious-and thus noncritical-nature of these basic beliefs, 
and not whether they are grounded in theory. 
The "Confounded Theory" Claim 
The second type of theoretical criticism is based on the 
claim that special education applied research and practice 
confound theories. The best example of this type of criticism 
is Jane Mercer's (1973) explanation of the way biological 
and psychological theories of deviance are confounded 
within the clinical perspective of mental retardation. Derived 
from medicine and psychology, the clinical perspective is 
the familiar frame of reference that guides research and 
practice in the helping professions, including special educa-
tion. This perspective contains two contrasting theories of 
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"normal/abnormal": the pathological model from medicine 
(biology), and the statistical model from psychology. 
The pathological model defines impairments according 
to the presence or absence of observable biological 
symptoms. Biological processes that interfere with system 
preservation are "bad," or pathological; those that enhance 
the life of the organism are "good," or healthy. Thus, the 
pathological model is bipolar: At one pole is normal (i.e., 
the absence of pathological symptoms and health); at the 
other pole is abnormal (i.e., the presence of pathological 
symptoms and illness or "unhealth"). The pathological 
model is essentially evaluative: To be abnormal is to be 
unhealthy; this is "bad" and should be prevented or al-
leviated. 
The statistical model is based on the concept of the normal 
(or bell-shaped) curve: In essence, an individual's attributes 
can be described by his or her relative position in a frequency 
distribution of other persons measured on those attributes. 
Whereas the pathological model defines abnormality as the 
presence of observable pathological symptoms, the statisti-
cal model defines abnormality according to the extent to 
which an individual varies from the average of a population 
on a particular attribute. Unlike the bipolar pathological 
model, which defines only one type of abnormality, the 
statistical model defines two types of abnormality: abnor-
mally large and abnormally small amounts of the measured 
characteristic. Whereas the pathological model is evaluative 
(pathological signs are always "bad"), the statistical model 
is evaluatively neutral; whether high is "good" and low is 
"bad" or high is "bad" and low is "good" depends on the 
attribute being measured. And whether it is "good" or "bad" 
to be high or low on any particular attribute is defined by 
society. As far as the attribute of intelligence, in our society 
abnormally high is "good," and abnormally low is "bad." 
Both models are used to define mental retardation-the 
pathological model for assessing biological manifestations 
and the statistical model for assessing behavorial manifesta-
tions, which are not comprehensible within the pathological 
model. Although instances of moderate to severe/profound 
mental retardation are associated with observable patterns 
of biological symptoms, and are thus comprehensible under 
the pathological model, most individuals labeled "mildly 
mentally retarded" do not show any biological signs. In 
these instances the statistical model is used and a low score 
on an intelligence (IQ) test is accepted as a symptom of 
pathology. The problem is that when the models are used 
in conjunction with one another, the tendency is to transpose 
them, turning behavioral patterns into pathological signs. 
Mercer (1973) explained the confusion by saying that: 
The implicit logic that underlies this transformation is as follows: 
Low IQ = "bad" in American society: a social evaluation. "Bad" 
= pathology in the pathological model. Therefore, low IQ = pathol-
ogy. Thus, IQ, which is not a biological manifestation but is a 
behavioral score based on responses to a series of questions, becomes 
conceptually transposed into a pathological sign carrying all of the 
implications of the pathological model. (pp. 5-6) 
Although Mercer identified a number of negative implica-
tions of the conceptual transposition, the primary implica-
tion-and the point of interest here-is the fact that mental 
retardation ends up being regarded as an attribute of the 
individual. The clinical perspective regards mental retarda-
tion as a pathological condition, and the pathology is consi-
dered to be an objective condition that individuals have. 
Although Mercer limits her criticism to the area of mental 
retardation, the same type of criticism has been made for 
special education research and practice in the area of learning 
disabilities (Rist & Harrell, 1982; Schrag & Divorky, 1975), 
and particularly in the area of emotional disturbance (Algoz-
zine, 1976, 1977; Apter, 1982; Hobbs, 1975; Rhodes, 1970; 
Ross, 1980; Swap, 1978). Together with mild mental retar-
dation, these areas make up the majority of all students 
identified as disabled. 
The "Wrong Theory" Claim 
The third type of theoretical criticism rests on the claim 
that special education applied/practical knowledge is based 
on the wrong theory, or that it relies too narrowly on one 
or more theories to the exclusion of others. Most instances 
of this type of criticism have been mounted by sociologists 
and political scientists who argue that special education de-
pends too heavily or exclusively on theory derived from the 
discipline of psychology and the associated disciplines be-
hind the field of medicine-ultimately, biology. The argu-
ment is that, by their very nature, these disciplines place 
the root cause of all disability and deviance within the per-
son, and exclude from consideration causal factors that lie 
in the larger social and political processes external to the 
individual. In addition, social scientists see diagnosis, inter-
vention, and technology based in the behavioral and biolog-
ical sciences as superficial because these do nothing to as-
sess, alter, or circumvent the social-political-cultural context 
of "disability." 
Whereas the behavioral and biological sciences study or-
ganisms and consider disability to be an objective condition 
that people have, the social sciences study social and political 
systems and processes and consider deviance to be a subjec-
tive condition that is societally created and maintained (see 
Gould, 1982; Szasz, 1961; Goffman, 1961, 1963; Scheff, 
1966; Scott, 1969; Braginsky & Braginsky, 1971; Lemert, 
1967; Davis, 1963; Wiseman, 1970; Bogdan, 1974; Gub-
rium, 1975; Bilden, 1977; Taylor & Bogdan, 1977). And 
this is more than an academic argument. Many of the social 
scientists who raise the issue are ultimately concerned with 
the impact of social and political processes on people and 
society. From their perspective, in the extreme, special edu-
cation in industrialized societies is an arm of education that 
creates and works against the social-political interests of 
powerless groups (Sarason & Doris, 1979; Smith, 1985; 
Barton & Tomlinson, 1984; Tomlinson, 1982; Farber, 
1968). 
THE IMPACT OF CRITICISM OF SPECIAL 
EDUCATION KNOWLEDGE 
Practical criticism-mounted by parents, consumers and 
advocates, and, in a more limited way, special educators 
themselves-was successful in bringing about changes in 
the way special education is practiced in public education, 
as those changes have been embodied in PL 94-142. But, 
as noted, criticism of special education's practical knowl-
edge does not resort to a critique of special education's 
theoretical or applied knowledge. Thus, it has had no effect 
on special education's unconscious assumptions. That is, 
although PL 94-142 brought about substantial changes in 
the organization and practice of special education, it rests 
on the same set of basic beliefs about the nature of disability, 
special education as a helping profession, and progress in 
the field. The first three assumptions-that disabilities are 
conditions people have, that disabled/typical is a useful and 
objective distinction, that special education is a rationally 
conceived and coordinated system that helps students who 
are labeled disabled-stand unaltered. Moreover, according 
to the fourth assumption, PL 94-142 is perceived as im-
proved diagnosis, intervention, and technology-an exam-
ple of progress. 
Unlike practical criticism, which at least has resulted in 
visible changes in the organization and practice of special 
education within public education, theoretical criticism has 
had few, if any, meaningful consequences for research or 
practice in special education. People from a number of dis-
ciplines and fields, including special education, have 
criticized special education's unconscious assumptions, or 
have attempted to convince the professional community of 
special education to expand its disciplinary base to include 
social and political theories of deviance. But no general 
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movement has been launched to alter special education pol-
icy and practice or to reorient its research based on these 
insights. 
Discussing the impact of theoretical criticism of special 
education applied research on the effectiveness of special 
education practice, Bogdan and Kugelmass (1984, p. 173) 
summarized the state of affairs succinctly by saying that, 
"In short, most research has been for special education (serv-
ing the field as it conceived of itself), not of special educa-
tion, that is looking at the field from an alternative vantage-
point." Special education applied research leaves un-
answered, and treats as unproblematic, fundamental ques-
tions about its unconscious assumptions. 
Thus, on one hand is practical criticism, which has re-
sulted in visible changes in the way special education is 
practiced but has had no effect on theory or the taken-for-
granted assumptions that derive from it. On the other hand 
is theoretical criticism, which has had virtually no impact 
on theory, research, or practice in special education. Special 
education practice has been altered by PL 94-142, but only 
within the frame of reference of special education's tradi-
tional assumptions about the nature of disability, special 
education as a helping profession, and progress in the field . 
Does PL 94-142 represent progress? Undoubtedly it does. 
But progress in this sense is only a limited sort of progress; 
it is progress within a particular frame of reference or set 
of basic assumptions. 
I am arguing that real progress in special education will 
require a different frame of reference. At a minimum, it 
will require that special education take seriously the critics 
of its theoretical and applied knowledge, and thus of its 
taken-for-granted assumptions. It will require criticism in 
the classical sense-self-reflective examination of the limits 
and validity of special education knowledge. But the prob-
lem is that the professional community of special education 
will not readily accept theoretical criticism, precisely be-
cause it contradicts its basic assumptions about the nature 
of disability, special education as a helping profession, and 
progress in the field. 
Of course, one could argue that, as a professional commu-
nity, special education demonstrated its ability to accept 
criticism-and even to engage in self-criticism--during the 
period leading to passage of PL 94-142. But most of that 
was practical criticism or criticism that could be deflected 
onto the regular education system. Special education could 
accept it because at bottom it did not contradict or conflict 
in any way with its basic assumptions. Theoretical criticism, 
however, is more difficult to accept precisely because it 
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contradicts those assumptions. Moreover, the problem is 
more than an inability to accept theoretical criticism. It is 
largely an inability to understand it. 
Professionals in all fields are prepared for practice-
whether practice is service delivery or applied research-
through a process that shapes their thought and behavior to 
conform to the established knowledge of the profession. 
The process requires total submission to the authority of the 
profession, an acceptance on faith of the profession's knowl-
edge. Professional induction is the efficient inculcation of 
the inductee with a commitment to a particular way of seeing 
the world and operating in it. 
Special education professionals-teachers, adminis-
trators, teacher trainers, applied researchers--ordinarily 
have difficulty understanding theoretical criticism because 
it is based on a view of the world and special education that 
falls outside of special education's established knowledge. 
Persons inside the professional community and their theoret-
ical critics on the outside literally are inhabitants of different 
conceptual worlds. They slice up the social world differently; 
they speak different languages and employ different con-
cepts. Moreover, professional autonomy means that nothing 
has compelled the special education professional community 
to listen to its critics. All judgments as to the adequacy of 
special education knowledge are left to the profession itself. 
And, of course, special education's inability to see itself as 
others do is not particularly unusual. This is an inherent 
characteristic of all professional communities. They all 
create and maintain their own conventionally-based reality. 
Each is an insulated sub-culture of conventional knowledge. 
Each is a way of seeing. 
THE CASE FOR MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
SPECIAL EDUCATION KNOWLEDGE 
The fact that special education can view itself from alter-
native vantage-points can be demonstrated through two ap-
proaches: longitudinal and cross-sectional. The longitudinal 
approach-looking at the same entity over time-is simple. 
To understand that special education can be viewed in dif-
ferent ways, one need only compare special education today 
with what it was at any given point in its past history. In 
this sense, the history of special education is the history of 
the redefinition of special education practice. We can see, 
for example, that special education practice in the 1940s 
was substantially different than it was in the 1960s, or than 
it is today. Here again, however, we must not lose sight of 
the fact that these changes have been largely changes in 
practice. Theoretical and applied knowledge-and thus the 
unconscious assumptions of the profession-have not 
changed. 
In contrast, the cross-sectional approach looks at one 
entity from different perspectives. Conventional special edu-
cation knowledge about the nature of disability is the result 
of the particular disciplinary base of theoretical knowledge 
that has been used and the manner in which it has been 
applied. Given the dominant model of professional knowl-
edge and the nature of professional education, the special 
education professional community not surprisingly is deeply 
committed to a biological-psychological explanation of dis-
ability. Nevertheless, we know that alternative theoretical 
conceptualizations of deviance, and thus alternative forms 
of potential special education knowledge, exist. A substan-
tial body of literature, deriving primarily from sociological, 
political, and cultural theories of deviance, and which pro-
vides many different perspectives on virtually every aspect 
of the notions of special education and "disability," is avail-
able. 
Once one accepts the position that special education and 
"disability" can be viewed in alternative ways and, more 
important, that each perspective has different implications 
for children labeled disabled and their parents and families, 
the argument that special education should consider itself 
and its professional knowledge from alternative vantage-
points is self-evident on ethica1' and moral grounds. For 
special education to continue to rely on an exclusively 
biological/psychological explanation of "disability" has no 
defensible argument. 
Today's special education knowledge is not inherently 
"correct." It is a matter of history-a history that could have 
taken a different course. If special education knowlege were 
to have had a broad base in, say, sociology, political science, 
anthropology, psychology, and biology, instead of a narrow 
base in psychology and biology, members of the professional 
community would think and act in very different ways. They 
would inhabit a different conceptual world, speak a different 
language, and employ different concepts. If this were so, 
the very notion of "disability" and the approach taken would 
be substantially different. Diagnosis, intervention, and 
technology would not be directed exclusively at the indi-
vidual but would just as likely be directed at the conceptual 
and material structures, systems, and processes external to 
the individual. Things such as organizations, institutions, 
and belief systems-not just children and youth-would be 
targets. 
Special education should expand its disciplinary base 
beyond psychology and biology to include the various social, 
political, and cultural sciences. Like most of the theoretical 
critics cited above, I believe that special education knowl-
edge should be multidisciplinary. "Multidisciplinary" is not 
the same as "interdisciplinary." Interdisciplinary refers to 
collaboration among professionals in the performance of 
services to clients. The case for interdisciplinary professional 
practice is a familiar argument by now (see Schein, 1972) 
and is based on the fact that many of the challenges society 
faces today are so complex that no single profession can 
deal with them effectively. This is not to miminize the need 
for interdisciplinary professional practice. Given the com-
plexity of problems in special education practice, interdiscip-
linary collaboration-among regular and special education 
practitioners, among various types of special educators, and 
among special education and related services profession-
als-is a necessity. The point to make is that special educa-
tion knowledge should be multidisciplinary, as well. Special 
education requires a substantial reorientation of theoretical, 
applied, and practical knowledge, and a concomitant revr-
sion in the professional education curriculum of special edu-
cation. 
This reorientation would begin with a multidisciplinary 
theoretical critique of special education knowledge-a self-
reflective examination of the limits and validity of special 
education knowledge from the alternative perspectives of 
the various social sciences. And, of course, the multidiscip-
linary theoretical analysis would be facilitated greatly by 
the fact that a number of alternative disciplinary analyses 
currently exist. Moreover, to be adequate, this substantially 
top-down analysis must incorporate the essentially bottom-
up practical criticism of current special education practice, 
opening up the possibility of uniting in one democratized 
discourse the interests of theorists, applied scientists, prac-
titioners, and consumers and advocates. 
Even if the professional community of special education 
could be persuaded to carry out a multidisciplinary theoret-
ical critique and to adopt a multidisciplinary orientation, 
however, these measures would not be sufficient to reorient 
special education knowledge. Today, theoretical criticism 
and a multidisciplinary orientation are simply not enough. 
METATHEORETICAL CRITICISM OF 
SPECIAL EDUCATION KNOWLEDGE 
A multidisciplinary theoretical criticism and a multidiscip-
linary reorientation of special education knowledge are not 
sufficient because the very notions of "theory" and "discip-
line" themselves are under attack today. The basis of the 
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reorientation of special education knowledge must go 
beyond theoretical criticism: The professional community 
of special education must attempt a metatheoretical critique 
of its professional knowledge. To understand the meaning 
of metatheoretical criticism, several additional concepts are 
introduced here. Central among these are the concepts of 
paradigm and paradigm shift. 
Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts 
For the past two decades the terms paradigm and 
paradigm shift have been associated most often with the 
influential work of Thomas Kuhn (1962, 1970a). Kuhn used 
these concepts in an analysis of scientific development in 
the physical or "hard" sciences, such as physics and chemis-
try. Kuhn reserved his analysis exclusively for the physical 
sciences, making no claim for its application to the social 
sciences. Nevertheless, Kuhn's work has had a profound 
effect on the social sciences, despite his reluctance to apply 
it there. 
Although the concept of a paradigm was the central ele-
ment in Kuhn's analysis of scientific progress, he was neither 
clear nor consistent about what he meant by it. Masterman 
( 1970) counted 21 different uses of the term in Kuhn's 
original work, which she reduced to three broad types of 
paradigms. Of the three types of paradigms-metaphysical, 
sociological, and construct-the metaphysical paradigm rep-
resents the broadest use of the term and subsumes the other 
two. A metaphysical paradigm is a total world view or 
gestalt within a given scientific community or sub-communi-
ty. 
The metaphysical paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within 
a given science. It serves to define the broad parameters of the field, 
or subareas within a field, giving the scientist a broad orientation 
from which to operate. (Ritzer, 1980, p. 5) 
In this sense, Kuhn used paradigm to mean a way of "see-
ing," a general organizing principle governing perception, 
a "map" that describes for scientists which entities exist 
(and which do not) and how they behave. 
Broadly construed, then, a paradigm is a set of explicit 
or implicit presuppositions or basic beliefs that scientists 
use to provide coherence to their picture of the world and 
how it works. These presuppositions or basic assumptions 
are metatheoretical assumptions. They are metatheoretical 
assumptions because they are beyond, or are more funda-
mental than, theories themselves. Metatheoretical assump-
tions are more fundamental than theories because observa-
tion-which, according to the conventional view of theory, 
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is the rock bottom upon which theory is founded (see Feigl, 
1970}--is itself strongly influenced by a prior conceptual 
system of metatheoretical assumptions (see Mulkay, 1979; 
Shimony, 1977). 
A metaphysical or metatheoretical paradigm (hereafter 
simply paradigm) can be thought of as a special lens through 
which the world can be viewed. This lens has the peculiar 
property that, while it may enhance the clarity with which 
some things can be viewed, it does not allow one to view 
other things. A paradigm is a particular lens, a particular 
way of seeing. A paradigm shift occurs when we abandon 
one lens (or way of seeing) for a different one. The new 
lens or paradigm provides a different way of seeing the 
world and making sense of it. 
Kuhn revolutionized our understanding of scientific 
knowledge by using the concepts of paradigm and paradigm 
shift to distinguish between continuous and discontinuous 
scientific progress. Continuous scientific progress-what 
Kuhn called "normal science"-progresses by gradual addi-
tions to a knowledge base. Normal science is a highly 
cumulative enterprise that refines, extends, and articulates 
a paradigm that already exists. An accepted paradigm is 
essential for scientific work because it unrandomizes nature 
and thus permits scientists to know what data are, what 
methods and instruments are necessary to retrieve them, and 
what concepts are relevant to their interpretation (Kuhn, 
1970a). 
Although normal science or continuous scientific progress 
is the typical image of scientific work, Kuhn's thesis is that 
it is only a necessary prelude to discontinuous scientific 
progress-real scientific discovery that uncovers new and 
unsuspected phenomena and invents radical new theories. 
Discontinuous scientific progress-what Kuhn called "re-
volutionary science"-is characterized by discontinuous 
breakthroughs that demand an entirely new set of 
metatheoretical assumptions--or, a new paradigm-for un-
derstanding data. Discoveries of this sort begin with the 
recognition and extended exploration of an anomaly, which 
is a violation of the paradigm-induced expectations of normal 
science. When the anomaly comes to be seen as more than 
just another normal science problem, the transition to 
paradigm crisis has begun. As the anomaly continues to 
resist, many of the field's most eminent scientists come to 
view its resolution as the subject matter of their field, which 
intensifies the crisis to the point where the rules of normal 
science are blurred. The paradigm exists, but few practition-
ers now can agree entirely about what it is. 
Loosening of the paradigm's rules gives rise to extraordi-
nary research and philosophical analysis. Extraordinary re-
search includes attempts to isolate and magnify the anomaly, 
random experimentation, and generation of speculative 
theories. Philosophical analysis is directed toward expos-
ing--often for the first time-the metatheoretical assump-
tions that underwrite the current paradigm and the contem-
porary research tradition. Together, extraordinary research 
and philosophical analysis loosen the paradigm's stereotypes 
and begin to provide the incremental data necessary for a 
fundamental paradigm shift. Sometimes the structure these 
procedures give the anomaly foreshadows the shape of the 
new paradigm. More often, however, the new paradigm 
emerges all at once-"sometimes in the middle of the night, 
in the mind of a man deeply immersed in crisis" (Kuhn, 
1970a, p. 90). In any event, the shift to a new paradigm is 
revolutionary science. Normal science rests on the mutual 
acceptance of a given paradigm among a community of 
scientists; revolutionary science requires a paradigm shift. 
After the shift, the stage is set for the process to repeat itself. 
Kuhn's view of scientific development as discontinuous 
progress placed him at odds with the prevailing view of 
scientific progress and the growth of knowledge. In effect, 
it introduced a major anomaly into the dominant paradigm 
of positivist knowledge. In place of the conventional as-
sumption of cumulative, convergent, and objective knowl-
edge, Kuhn substituted the idea that science and knowledge 
are discontinuous, divergent, and subjective. 
The Subjectivity of Science and Knowledge 
A key element in Kuhn's original work was that the pro-
cess by which one paradigm replaces another paradigm is 
essentially a political phenomenon, a process of persuasion 
and conversion, with the victorious paradigm being the one 
that wins the most converts (Ritzer, 1980). Thus, irrational 
and subjective factors may affect and even determine the 
emergence of a new paradigm. In the face of criticisms that 
he overemphasized irrationality in scientific work (see 
Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970), Kuhn subsequently retreated 
from this position (Kuhn, 1970b). Nevertheless, it was this 
aspect of his analysis that was most attractive to those who 
have extended his work. 
Using Kuhn's thesis to frame their work, proponents have 
argued that indeed paradigms in the physical sciences rise 
and fall as a result of subjective, not objective, factors (e.g., 
Bloor, 1976; Law, 1975; Phillips, 1973; Knorr, Krohn, & 
Whitley, 1981). Krohn (1981, p. xi) summarized the first 
body of empirical work on scientific practice-the ethnog-
raphic and detailed historical study of actual scientific activ-
ity- by saying that "[physical] scientists are literally 
constructing their world rather than merely describing it." 
Kuhn's work was important for what it had to say about the 
role of culture and tradition in the production of knowledge. 
His analysis of the conventional nature of knowledge and 
the nature of convention itself contradicted the common 
perception that science and knowledge are objective, and 
advanced the idea that both depend on their cultural context 
for meaning and interpretation. 
Barry Barnes (1982, p. 10) noted the significance of the 
subculture in science, and the communal activity of the 
organized practitioners who sustain it, when he said that 
"the culture is far more than the setting for scientific research; 
it is the research itself." The image of the scientist as an 
objective and impersonal observer in the process of knowl-
edge discovery is being replaced by the image of the scientist 
as craftsperson who, bound by the culture of a particular 
place and time, creates knowledge that is assumed to be of 
temporary utility and validity (Ravetz, 1971). This revised 
image of science and scientific work has necessarily caused 
a revision in the very legacy of knowledge. Once conceived 
as "a separate verbal and symbolic high culture [with] the 
power to reveal, order and enlighten ... [it] is being brought 
down to earth, demystified as a human construction, in the 
natural as well as the social [sciences]" (Krohn, 1981, p. xii). 
At this point we can begin to see the parallels between 
the work of the basic scientists and the work of the applied 
scientists and professional practitioners. The latter groups 
operate on the basis of received knowledge-that is, knowl-
edge that each accepts on faith from higher levels in the 
hierarchy of professional knowledge. Although this is the 
case for applied researchers and professional practitioners, 
the assumption had been that the theoretical know ledge of 
the basic sciences was itself objective knowledge about re-
ality. The key point to grasp is that, like the applied scientist 
and professional practitioner, basic scientists operate on the 
basis of received knowledge. Theirs is not objective knowl-
edge but, rather, knowledge received by looking at the world 
through the lens of a particular paradigm or set of 
metatheoretical assumptions. 
From Kuhn's description of the induction of physical 
scientists into scientific communities, we can see now that 
all three groups-basic scientists, applied researchers, and 
professional practitioners-are inducted into subcultures of 
conventional knowledge, which they "receive" on faith as 
the only way of unrandomizing the complexity of their par-
ticular worlds of practice. Like the craftsperson, each is 
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bound by the culture of a particular place and time. Like 
the image of science and the legacy of knowledge, the role 
of basic scientist has been demystified and brought down 
to earth. 
Social Scientific Thought 
Although Kuhn reserved his conception of paradigms and 
paradigm shifts exclusively for the physical sciences, further 
extensions of his work have allowed an understanding of 
the paradigmatic status of the social sciences. Masterman 
( 1970) made an important contribution in this regard in 
using the concept of a paradigm to distinguish four types 
of sciences: paradigmatic, nonparadigmatic, dual paradig-
matic, and multiple paradigmatic. For Masterman, a 
paradigmatic science is one having broad consensus within 
the scientific community on a particular paradigm. Examples 
of a science achieving the paradigmatic state are relatively 
few, but some do exist. Physics is the primary example. 
Until the birth of the Einsteinian paradigm in this century, 
physics was dominated by the Newtonian paradigm. Al-
though some scientists doubted the Newtonian paradigm, 
physics during the period between Newton and Einstein is 
perhaps as close as a science can come to the paradigmatic 
state. 
Nonparadigmatic science is the situation in which no 
consensus exists on a paradigm. Before Newton, physics 
presumably lacked consensus and therefore was, at that point 
in its development, a nonparadigmatic science. The dual 
paradigmatic state exists immediately before a Kuhnian sci-
entific revolution, when two paradigms-the older, crisis-
ridden paradigm and the new, emerging paradigm-are 
vying for the dominance that only one of them ultimately 
will achieve. The Newtonian paradigm dominated physics 
until increasing anomalies set it up for defeat by the Einstei-
nian paradigm (see Clark, 1971), but at the point when both 
paradigms were competing for dominance, physics was a 
dual paradigm science. 
The final type of science discussed by Masterman is the 
multiple paradigmatic science, in which several viable 
paradigms compete unsuccessfully for dominance within the 
scientific community. The multiple paradigm state is particu-
larly important for our purposes because it permits differen-
tiation between the physical and social sciences on the basis 
of their paradigmatic status. The various physical sciences 
(more or less) are paradigmatic sciences. The birth of a 
particular physical science can be thought of as the point at 
which it emerged from a nonparadigmatic state and achieved 
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its paradigmatic status. From there, its history is a series of 
discontinuous progressions in which normal science-now 
posible because of paradigmatic consensus-produces the 
anomalies necessary to create a crisis big enough to yield 
a scientific revolution, and thus a new paradigm. 
On the other hand, the social sciences are multiple 
paradigm sciences. Unlike the physical sciences, in which 
one paradigm dominates until crisis and revolution replace 
it in toto with another paradigm, multiple paradigms co-exist 
in the social sciences. This means that scientific revolutions 
in the Kuhnian sense are virtually impossible in the social 
sciences because there is no dominant paradigm to be over-
thrown. Although the social sciences always have had re-
volutionary ways to think, all of the paradigms for thinking 
about the social world emerged-relative to the way physical 
science paradigms emerge-more or less together. Each one 
is a viable way to understand the social world, and each 
has had its own followers. 
Allegiances have shifted throughout history, and one or 
another paradigm has dominated particular regions of the 
globe. But no general consensus-and thus no single domin-
ant paradigm of social scientific thought-has been reached. 
Not only has this precluded revolutionary science, but it 
also has made normal science more difficult because, as 
Ritzer (1980) noted, social scientists are forced to spend an 
inordinate amount of energy engaging in the politics of 
winning converts and defending their flanks against attack 
from rival paradigms. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) conceptualized the multiple 
paradigms in the social sciences by considering the relation-
ship between two dimensions of intellectual tradition: 
philosophy of science, and theories of society. Philosophy 
of science is a branch of philosophy that studies the reasoning 
processes behind the concepts, presuppositions, and 
methodology of science. Among other things, philosophers 
of science are concerned with the consequences of scientific 
knowledge for matters such as our perception of reality and 
the validity and limits of our sources of knowledge (Angeles, 
1981). Burrell and Morgan used four traditional strands of 
debate within philosophy of science to formulate the 
philosophy of science or "objective-subjective" dimension 
of their analysis: ontology (the nature of reality), epistemol-
ogy (the nature of knowledge), human nature (the nature of 
human action), and methodology (the nature of inquiry). 
Table 1 presents the extreme positions on each of the four 
strands of debate. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (also see Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980), the realist assumes that the social world 
exists "out there," independent of an individual's apprecia-
tion of it, and that it is virtually as hard and concrete as the 
physical world. The nominalist, in contrast, assumes that 
the social world external to individual cognition is made up 
of names, concepts, and labels that serve as tools for describ-
ing, making sense of, and negotiating the external world. 
The positivist seeks to explain and predict social events by 
searching for regularities and determinate causal relation-
ships. Growth of knowledge is seen as essentially a cumula-
tive process in which new information is added to the existing 
stock of knowledge and false hypotheses are eliminated. 
The anti-positivist, conversely, assumes the social world to 
be essentially relativistic-understandable, but only from 
the point of view of the individuals directly involved in the 
activities to be investigated. Anti-positivists reject the notion 
of "observer" as a valid vantage point for understanding 
human activities. 
TABLE 1 
The Objective-Subjective Dimension 
Subjectivist 
Social Science 
Objectivist 
Social Science 
Nominalism ---------- ontology ------------------ Realism 
Anti-positivism ------ epistemology --------- Positivism 
Voluntarism ---------- human nature ----- Determinism 
ldiographic ----------- methodology --------- Nomothetic 
Source: Burrell & Morgan (1979, p. 3). 
Determinists assume that humans respond mechanistically 
or even deterministically to the situations encountered in 
their external world. Voluntarists ascribe a much more crea-
tive human role. Free will and autonomy are assumed and 
humans are seen as creating their environments, controlling 
them rather than being controlled by them. Nomothetic 
methodologies are adopted by social scientists who treat the 
social world as if it were a hard, objective, external reality. 
The search is for universal laws that explain and govern the 
one, concrete, objective social reality that is presumed to 
exist. Idiographic methodologies are adopted by those who 
assume the importance of the subjective experience of iJ1di-
viduals in creating their social world. The principal concern 
for social scientists using idiographic methodologies is to 
understand the ways indiyiduals create, modify, and inter-
pret the social world in which they find themselves. 
The extreme positions of the objective-subjective dimen-
sion are reflected in two major intellectual traditions that 
have dominated social science for 200 years. Objectivist 
social science is logical positivism, the dominant position 
in the West, which: 
. . . reflects the attempt to apply the models and methods of the 
natural sciences to the study of human affairs . It treats the social 
world as if it were the natural world, adopting a "realist" approach 
to ontology . . . backed up by a "positivist" epistemology, relatively 
"deterministic" views of human nature and the use of "nomothetic" 
methodologies . (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 7) 
The subjectivist position, German idealism, stands in com-
plete opposition to positivism in that: 
. . . it is based upon the premise that the ultimate reality of the 
universe lies in "spirit" or "idea" rather than in the data of sense 
perception. It is essentially "nominalist" in its approach to social 
reality . . . "anti positivist" in epistemology, "voluntarist" with regard 
to human nature and it favours idiographic methods as a foundation 
for social analysis. (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 7) 
Burrell and Morgan used the terms "sociology of regula-
tion" and "sociology of radical change" to describe the ex-
treme positions on their "nature of society," or "order-con-
flict," dimension. Table 2 differentiates between the two 
positions by counterposing the issues with which each is 
concerned. 
TABLE 2 
The Regulation-Radical Change Dimension 
The sociology of The sociology of 
regulation is radical change is 
concerned with: concerned with: 
The status quo ----------- Radical change 
Social order --------------- Structural conflict 
Consensus ---------------- Modes of domination 
Social integration -------- Contradiction 
Solidarity ------------------- Emancipation 
Need satisfaction -------- Deprivation 
Actuality -------------------- Potentiality 
Adapted from Burrell & Morgan (1979, p. 18). 
Sociology of regulation-the dominant pos1t10n in the 
West-reflects the value position of theorists who are con-
cerned about explaining society's underlying unity and cohe-
sion. Conversely, theorists of the sociology of radical change 
view modem society as being characterized by conflict, 
modes of domination, and contradiction. They are concerned 
with people's emancipation from existing social structures. 
Ritzer ( 1980) proposed another way to think about the 
same intellectual territory coverd in the Burrell and Morgan 
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analysis. He used the same objective-subjective dimension 
but substituted a "levels of social reality" dimension in place 
of Burrell and Morgan's order-conflict dimension. Ritzer 
used a "macroscopic-microscopic" dimension in which the 
magnitude of social phenomena-that is, social reality rang-
ing from whole societies to social acts--differentiates among 
theoretical positions. Ritzer's "microscopic" level corres-
ponds to the "order" end of Burrell and Morgan's order-con-
flict dimension, and his "macroscopic" level corresponds to 
the "conflict" position. In either case, when the two dimen-
sions are counterposed orthogonally, they produce four 
paradigms of social scientific thought (see Figure 1) based 
on mutually exclusive views of the social world and how it 
might be investigated. Each of the four paradigms-what 
we will refer to, following Burrell and Morgan, as the 
functionalist, interpretive, humanist, and structuralist 
paradigms-rests on a fundamentally different set of 
metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of science and 
of society (i.e., the nature of social science). 
The functionalist paradigm is the dominant framework 
for social science in the Western world. It is firmly grounded 
in the sociology of regulation, takes a more or less micro-
scopic view of social reality, and studies its subject matter 
from an objectivist point of view. It seeks to provide rational 
explanations of social affairs using an approach to science 
premised in the tradition oflogical positivism. As such, it: 
. . . reflects the attempt, par excellence, to apply the models and 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of human affairs . . . 
The functionalist approach to social science tends to assume that the 
social world is composed of relatively concrete empirical artifacts 
and relationships which can be identified, studied and measured 
through approaches derived from the natural sciences . (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979 , p. 26) 
Subjective 
Humanist 
Conflict 
Macroscopic 
Structuralist 
(Macro-Subjective) (Macro-Objective) 
Interpretive Functionalist 
(Micro-Subjective) (Micro-Objective) 
Order 
Microscopic 
Objective 
Adapted from Burrell & Morgan (1979, p. 29) and Ritzer (1980, p. 239). 
FIGURE 1 
Four Paradigms of Social Scientific Thought 
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The functionalist paradigm is equivalent to what Ritzer re-
ferred to as the "micro-objective" approach to social science. 
Theorists operating from this vantage-point are concerned 
with explaining social life by concentrating on microscopic 
social phenomena such as patterns of behavior, action, and 
interaction. 
Interpretive theorists are only implicitly committed to reg-
ulation and order. They assume that the social world is 
cohesive, ordered, and integrated, but (unlike the 
functionalists) they are oriented toward understanding the 
ongoing processes through which humans subjectively create 
their social world. The interpretive paradigm addresses the 
same social issues as the functionalist paradigm, but it is 
concerned with understanding the essence of the everyday 
world as an emergent social process. When a social world 
outside the consciousness of the individual is recognized, 
it is regarded as a network of assumptions and intersubjec-
tively shared meanings. The interpretive paradigm corres-
ponds to Ritzer's micro-subjective level of social reality. 
Theorists of this persuasion are concerned with understand-
ing the various facets of the social contruction of reality--the 
way people create and share meaning (see Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967). 
Although humanists share a view of social science with 
the interpretive paradigm, their frame of reference is the 
sociology of radical change. The humanist paradigm views 
society with a prime concern toward the importance of trans-
cending the limitations of existing social structures. 
Humanism views the ideological superstructures with which 
people interact as a screen between them and their true 
consciousness. Thus, society is viewed as being antihu-
man-as inhibiting human development and fulfillment. 
Humanist theorizing centers on a critique of the status quo, 
from what Ritzer called the "macro-subjective" level of so-
cial reality. As such, humanists concentrate on the influence 
of ideological structures--culture, norms, and values--0n 
human action. 
Like humanism, the structuralist paradigm mounts a 
critique of the status quo and advocates change. But it takes 
this stance from the perspective of the objectivist, thus shar-
ing an approach to social science with the functionalist 
paradigm. Structuralists view contemporary society as being 
characterized by fundamental conflicts that generate change 
through political and economic crisis. Whereas humanists 
are concerned with ideological structures and individual con-
sciousness, structuralists focus their critique upon material 
structures-including social arrangements-and are con-
cerned with the consciousness of entire classes of individu-
als. Structuralist theorists occupy Ritzer' s macro-objective 
level and approach social science with a concern to explain 
social entities such as society, law, bureaucracy, architec-
ture, technology, and language. 
The basic point is that the approach social scientists take 
depends on their metatheoretical assumptions with respect 
to the nature of the social world and how it may be inves-
tigated. The particular combination of metatheoretical as-
sumptions explicitly or, as is most often the case, implicitly 
defines the paradigm and provides the frame of reference 
of social scientists who work within it. Each paradigm pro-
duces knowledge that is based on a unique brand of insight. 
Each paradigm is a way of seeing. 
The Paradigm Shift in Science and Civilization 
Using the scheme presented in Figure 1 as a backdrop, 
we can begin to see the radical implications of the ideas of 
paradigms and paradigm shifts. From Kuhn, and the exten-
sions of his original work, we can see that the very notions 
of paradigm and paradigm shift support a subjectivist 
philosophy of science. Whether we think of the process of 
total paradigm replacement in the physical sciences, or the 
process of competitive co-existence among multiple 
paradigms in the social sciences, the idea that paradigms 
exist in the minds of humans, who then operate under their 
received meaning, is the type of thinking about knowing 
that is possible only from a subjectivist view of science and 
knowledge. The concepts of paradigm and paradigm shift 
can exist only in the interpretive and humanist paradigms. 
They are conceptually impossible in the two objectivist 
paradigms, which assume a single objective reality as one 
of their metatheoretical assumptions. 
Further evidence for a paradigm shift in the physical and 
social sciences was provided by Schwartz and Ogilvy ( 1979) 
in their analysis of the 20th century Kuhnian paradigm shifts 
in physics, chemistry, brain theory, ecology, evolution, 
mathematics, philosophy, politics, psychology, linguistics, 
religion, consciousness, and the arts. They argued that, taken 
together, the manifestations of these disciplinary shifts 
characterize an emergent world view in the formal discip-
lines that is moving away from objectivism and positivism 
and toward a subjectivist view of science and knowledge. 
At yet a broader level of human consciousness, Schwartz 
and Ogilvy argued that the values inherent in the disciplinary 
paradigm shift foreshadow an emergent shift in the entire 
consciousness of Western civilization. Evidence supporting 
this assertion, of course, is all around us. Our current world 
view itself is the result of the 17th century scientific revolu-
tions that collectively became the Enlightenment. The New-
tonian world view emanating from that paradigm shift is 
reflected today in every aspect of our social order. Its models 
and metaphors are embedded in our language, our history, 
our science. These mental maps of the world are the found-
ations of Western values and beliefs-the very values and 
beliefs that made the functionalist paradigm the dominant 
social science paradigm in the West. In the future, according 
to Schwartz and Ogilvy, Western values and beliefs will 
conform to the subjectivist metatheoretical assumptions. 
The Meta-Leap to Antifoundational Knowledge 
According to Schwartz and Ogilvy, even though science 
and civilization have shifted paradigms before, the current 
paradigm shift is even more revolutionary because this time 
the patterns of change have themselves changed. Not only 
do we appear to be at the threshold of a new paradigm or 
world view, but we know that there are paradigms. This 
awareness itself is part of the new paradigm because it took 
a shift to the subjectivist paradigms before we could com-
prehend a paradigm or a paradigm shift. Our current 
paradigm amounts to the view that there are no such things 
as paradigms; only the "facts" are important-seeing is be-
lieving. 
But now Western science has begun to take seriously the 
proposition that what we believe determines much of what 
we see, and that the notion of an objective science is illusio-
nary. Until this century, the assumption was that we could 
study the social world objectively by using the methods and 
models of the physical sciences. Now we have discovered 
that even in the physical world inquiry affects results. Our 
disciplines themselves are not neutral to the world. Believing 
is seeing. 
The common view that social science is a neutral, techni-
cal process that reveals or discovers knowledge is being 
replaced by an appreciation of social sciences as a distinc-
tively human process through which knowledgejs created. 
Each paradigm produces a unique brand of insight. Histor- -
ically, debate in the social sciences has been premised on 
a foundational view of knowledge, which has led to argu-
ments over the "best" way of doing research or the "best" 
theory to explain social phenomena. But today, debate is 
moving beyond considerations of a single research method, 
theory, or paradigm, and social scientists are beginning to 
call for an antifoundational, reflective discourse about and 
appreciation of the variety of available research logics, 
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theoretical positions, and paradigmatic perspectives (see 
Morgan, 1983; Soltis, 1984). Moreover, recognition of the 
selection of a particular research strategy, theory, or 
paradigm as problematic and value-laden is forcing us to 
recognize social science as a political, moral, and ethical 
undertaking as much as a technical one. 
The Paradigmatic Status of Special Education Knowledge 
Special education's disciplinary base in biology 
(medicine) and psychology yields an approach to diagnosis, 
intervention, and technology grounded in diagnostic-pre-
scriptive teaching and behavioristic theory. Diagnostic-
prescriptive teaching is the attempt to design instructional 
programs on the basis of test performances. Of the two 
theoretical models within the diagnostic-prescriptive ap-
proach-ability-training and task-analysis-Salvia and 
Y sseldyke ( 1981) noted the preference in special education 
for the latter because of the lack of reliable and valid norm-re-
ferenced assessment devices necessary to actualize the abil-
ity training model . 
The task-analysis model is based on the application of 
behavioristic theory to instruction in specific skills. Complex 
instructional goals are task-analyzed into subskills and taught 
using a hierarchy of behavioral procedures for skill acquis-
ition (see White & Haring, 1976). The teacher is concep-
tualized as a technician applying a technology of teaching 
commonly referred to as "systematic instruction," which: 
... has grown out of the experimental analysis of behavior, which, 
as a scientific discipline, sought to find a systematic interpretation 
of human behavior based on generalized principles, or laws, of 
behavior. The goal of this search for laws of behavior was much the 
same as in any other branch of science----to make reliable predictions 
(Skinner, 1953). The development of behavior analysis has been 
rigorously scientific, beginning with basic laboratory research and 
slowly generalizing the results to social situation . (Haring, 1978, p. 
21) 
Burrell and Morgan ( 1979) locate behaviorism in the extreme 
objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm. 
Skinner's perspective is a highly coherent and consistent one in terms 
of the four strands of the subjective-objective dimension of our analyt-
ical scheme. Ontologically, his view is firmly realist; epistemologi-
cally, his work is the archetype of positivism; his view of human 
nature reflects a determinism of an extreme form; the highly nomothe-
tic methodology reflected in his experimental approach is congruent 
with these other assumptions. (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 103) 
This places special education knowledge in the most extreme 
objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm, as shown 
in Figure 2 (see also Heshusius, 1982). 
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FIGURE 2 
Paradigmatic Status of Special Education Knowledge 
THE CASE FOR MULTIPARADIGMATIC, 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY SPECIAL 
EDUCATION KNOWLEDGE 
Special education can and should view itself from alterna-
tive vantage-points. You will recall that the fact that special 
education can view itself from alternative vantage-points 
was demonstrated using both a longitudinal and a cross-sec-
tional explanation. The basic concept to grasp about the 
cross-sectional explanation at this point is that, in addition 
to the possibility of considering special education knowledge 
from a number of alternative disciplines, the very nature of 
those disciplines necessitates consideration of special educa-
tion knowledge from the multiple paradigms of social scien-
tific thought. As we have seen, to consider any of the social 
science disciplines as a unitary body of thought is simply 
inadequate. 
Once one accepts the position that special education can 
be viewed in alternative disciplinary ways, and that each 
perspective has different implications for the lives of children 
labeled disabled and their parents and families, there is no 
morally or ethically defensible argument for special educa-
tion to continue to rely on an exclusively biological/ 
psychological interpretation of "disability." At this point we 
can extend the moral and ethical argument by referring to 
the multiple paradigmatic status of the social sciences and 
the notion of antifoundational knowledge. That is, given 
that we know that multiple paradigms exist in the social 
sciences, and that no particular paradigm is inherently cor-
rect, and that each paradigm has different implications for 
children labeled disabled and their parents and families, 
there is no morally defensible argument for the special edu-
cation community to rely exclusively on a functionalist con-
ceptualization of the social sciences. 
Special education should expand its disciplinary base 
beyond psychology and biology to include the various social, 
political, and cultural sciences. At a minimum, special edu-
cation knowledge should be multidisciplinary. But given 
the multiparadigmatic status of the social sciences and the 
antifoundational implications of the paradigm shift, an 
adequate response would require that special education adopt 
a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary stance. This stance 
would begin with a multiparadigmatic, metatheoretical 
critique of special education knowledge-an antifounda-
tional, self-reflective examination of the limits and validity 
of special education knowledge from the alternative perspec-
tives of the multiple paradigms of social scientific thought. 
And it would end with a democratized, multiparadigmatic, 
multidisciplinary reorientation of all levels of special educa-
tion knowledge and concomitant modifications in the cur-
riculum of special education professional education. This 
reorientation of special education professional knowledge 
would produce a community of special education profession-
als who think and act in ways that are substantially different 
from their contemporary counterparts. 
But, of course, a number of factors are working against 
the possibility of a reorientation of special education knowl-
edge. Paradigm shifts take time and are bitterly resisted. 
Moreover, the meta-leap to antifoundational knowledge it-
self requires a prior paradigm shift. Nevertheless, as we 
have seen, there are some encouraging developments on all 
of these fronts. In fact, there even has been some movement 
in the field of special education, both at the level of practice 
(Heshusius, 1982) and at the level of applied research (Stain-
back & Stainback, 1984). In both cases, the argument has 
been for a shift from the functionalist to the interpretive 
paradigm (refer to Figure 2), which of course reflects the 
broader paradigm shift in science and civilization. 
As might be expected from the foregoing discussion, the 
(published) reactions of the special education community to 
these proposals has been decidedly negative (see Ulman & 
Rosenberg, 1986; Simpson & Eaves, 1985). In both cases, 
the defenders of the prevailing functionalist paradigm 
evaluate and dismiss the proposals of the advocates for the 
interpretive paradigm exclusively on the basis of 
functionalist criteria, which they implicitly assume to be 
foundational-and thus the only criteria that exist. They 
demonstrate no recognition of the possibility of alternative 
frames of reference, to say nothing of the possibility of 
antifoundational knowledge. Although the original propos-
als and the advocates' responses to the def enders' reactions 
to them (Heshusius, 1986; Stainback & Stainback, 1985) 
were informative and thought provoking, the exchange could 
hardly be called a discourse. Exchanges like this serve the 
purpose of educating the field and introducing anomalies, 
but what is needed is a sustained discourse in which all 
participants recognize the existence-and the moral and 
political implications-of multiple paradigms and antifoun-
dational knowledge. 
If an informed discourse of this nature could be initiated 
and sustained in a manner that would enhance special edu-
cation's capacity for reflective self-criticism, two additional 
problems potentially would arise. First, there is the danger 
of the discourse becoming a substitute for action. Given the 
moral and political implications of the nature of special 
education knowledge, we do not have the luxury of time; 
every day counts. Second, there is the danger that the dis-
course will remain at the level of paradigms. As Morgan 
and Smircich (1980) noted, such a debate might lead to 
merely replacing one dominant paradigm with another do-
minant paradigm. We must not lose sight of the implications 
of antifoundational knowledge. The discourse must be raised 
to the meta-level of the multiple paradigms of social scien-
tific thought and not be permitted to degenerate into a narrow 
debate over "the best paradigm." 
Finally, even if such a discourse could be mounted and 
sustained to the point at which it would produce a fundamen-
tal and ongoing reorientation of special education knowledge 
and professional education, it would not be sufficient to 
substantially alter the actual practice of special education. 
Special education is not an island. It is merely a subsystem 
within the larger system of public education. Criticism of 
special education knowledge and practice necessarily will 
spill over into criticism of the knowledge base and practice 
of general education. In a sense, this article is a start in that 
direction, for virtually everything that has been said in it 
applies equally well to general education knowledge. 
In summary, I believe that special education knowledge 
should be paradigmatic and multidisciplinary. Arriving at 
this point will require the initiation of a multiparadigmatic, 
metatheoretical critique of special education knowledge in 
the context of a democratized, informed, sustained discourse 
on the moral, ethical, and political implications of the choice 
of a frame of reference on the lives of children and youth 
and their parents and families. And it will be essential to 
expand the critique and the discourse to the entire system 
of public education in this country. 
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